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Mr. Chancellor, Mr. Dean and Members of the Graduating Class:
I am well aware that what I have to say this evening cannot
prove of general interest to the audience which is here assembled.
But I am confident that the friends who grace this festival with
their presence recognize the fact that this occasion belongs to
the graduating class, and that any words spoken to-night should
be addressed to them. If I can say anything which may be help-
ful to these gentlemen who now have completed the preparation
which the Law School affords and are about to assume the heavy
responsibility which active practice of the law imposes, I shall feel
that this evening has been well spent though my words prove to be
silver and not gold, and my speech be ungarlanded with even "thc
humble flowers of the mountains."
Gentlemen of the graduating class: I do not assume to speak to
you as one clothed with authority, but as one who through experi-
ence and observation is entitled to speak as an elder to younger
brethren.
You stand to-night on the threshold of the temple of the law
and await the opening of the gates which shall admit you as of the
priesthood of justice and give you membership in a profession
which is one of the most ancient, the most enlightened, the most
illustrious and the most honorable of all vocations. It is a profes-
sion which in this country has been adorned by many men of signal
brilliancy and of imperishable fame. When one recalls John Mar-
shall, Hamilton, Story, Kent, Taney, Pinkney, Wirt, Webster, and
*An address delivered before the graduating class of the Albany Law
School, May 3, i96.
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Choate,-"The names that were not born to die," intellectual mon-
archs, "a galaxy of the gods"-one may be pardoned for asserting
that "the glory of our profession is the glory of our country." To
become a high-priest in the Temple of Justice is worthy of the high-
est ambition of the noblest men. To establish justice is the pur-
pose of the profession. To serve the state in maintaining the rights
of man to life, liberty, property and reputation is its mission. To
aid the helpless and relieve the oppressed, to defend the innocent
and punish the guilty, to resist even the government itself when it
seeks to encroach upon the constitutional rights of the people-this
is the lawyer's work and the lawyer's duty.
In a state with a backward civilization and an autocrat upon the
throne there may be little need for members of our profession.
When Peter the Great visited Westminster it is said he learned with
wonder that some scores of oddly apparelled persons whom he had
curiously asked about were lawyers. "What! all these lawyers?"
was his exclamation. "I have but two in all my dominion," he con-
tinued, "and I intend to hang one of them as soon as I get home."
The story reveals the difference in the civilization of the two coun-
tries. In the one there was a government of laws and not of men,
and the lawyers were numerous and influential. In the other the
government was the Czar and his will was law and there was no
need of lawyers. And when Jack Cade's insurrection was thought
to have succeeded, Dick the Butcher said to Jack: "The first thing
we do, let's kill all the lawyers." Thereupon Cade replied: "Nay,
that I mean to do." Under a government conducted by men of his
ilk lawyers might easily be dispensed with. But under a govern-
ment of laws and not of men lawyers are indispensable.
In one of the learned professions those who cherish intellectual
integrity often find themselves, according to their own admissions,
more or less embarrassed. Original thinking is, they claim, discour-
aged in their professional schools, the methods of which are too
often narrowing and deadening to intellectual growth. Judged by
their own statements we find, in a profession in which intellectual
honesty should be exalted, that it is discouraged. In the legal pro-
fession intellectual honesty is never anathematized. Indeed no man
can reach eminence in our profession unless he possesses intellectual
honesty. Mr. Edward J. Phelps once said that the leading character-
istic of every great lawyer or great judge that had ever lived was
intellectual honesty. It is sometimes necessary in the law as in the
ministry to excommunicate one who has shown himself unworthy of
confidence. But when a lawyer is disbarred it is always because of
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unethical conduct, and never because the profession wishes to fetter
the freedom of his mind. In schools of law, however it may be in
schools of theology, original thinking is encouraged. The student
in the law schools is not compelled to accept dogmatic teaching on
authority which is not to be disputed. He has the right to reason
why. He is to test the judgment of courts by reading, comparisoa
and discussion, that he may satisfy his own mind whether the con-
clusions reached are right or wrong. If tradition is on one side
and truth on the other, it is always his privilege to show the mis-
take and reveal the truth. There is little embarrassment with us in
adjusting old opinions to new knowledge, and we are not divided
into orthodox and heterodox according as we accept the new learn-
ing or the old. There is no necessity with us that heresy-debaters
should
"Prove their doctrine orthodox
By Apostolic blows and knocks."
But whatever may be the embarrassments of this sort to which
the theologian is subjected, the lawyer has difficulties enough of his
own and of which the theologian is wholly ignorant.
"Much lighter task the minister's
Than is the lawyer's, one infers;
The simple fact is,
As adage and experience teach,
It is much easier to preach
Than 'tis to practice."
The practice of the law has sometimes been represented as a
tricky sort of business, and the advocate as a "shady" sort of indi-
vidual. Charles Macklin characterized the law as "a sort of hocus-
pocus science that smiles in your face while it picks yer pocket, and
the glorious uncertainty of it is of mair use to the professors than
the justice of it." And Dr. Johnson, when asked at a dinner party
as to the identity of a guest who had just left the room, said: "Gen-
tlemen, I do not like to speak ill of a man behind his back, but I
believe he is a lawyer." And there is the story of one looking about
in a country churchyard and coming upon a stone with the inscrip-
tion: "A good lawyer and an honest man." "It is very strange,"
he said, "that where land is so cheap they should bury two men in
one grave."
But all such characterizations of the profession are after all not
meant to be taken seriously. The practical judgment of those who
are competent to form an intelligent opinion is that the bar is not
surpassed in honesty, candor and honor by any class of men of like
numbers. No person can become a lawyer unless he can satisfy the
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court not only that he has sufficient knowledge of the law to entitle
him to enter upon the duties of an attorney, but that he has what is
equally, if not more, important-a good moral character. As it is
essential to his admission to the bar in the first place that the appli-
cant be in truth and in fact a good, moral man, it is certainly equally
essential that he maintains that character after he has been admitted.
An attorney will be disbarred whenever it is demonstrated to the
court that he is not an honest man, for the lawyer in becoming dis-
honest violates the essential condition upon which he was admitted
to the bar, and forfeits all claim to recognition either by his profes-
sional brethren or by the courts.
The philosophers tell us that jurisprudence has its base in ethics.
A profession which is devoted to jurisprudence, and which is, there-
fore, continually concerned with questions of right and wrong, must
itself inevitably be governed by high ethical standards. Indeed no
one of the professions affords a nobler intellectual pursuit, and not
one establishes for the conduct of its members a higher moral stand-
ard. A written code of legal ethics has never been formulated by
the American Bar Association. And in the admirable address deliv-
ered not long ago before the students of this school by Judge Lan-
don of the New York Court of Appeals that distinguished jurist
stated that he did not know that any bar association had attempted
to establish in concrete detail a comprehensive professional code.
A code of medical ethics was adopted a number of years ago by the
medical profession in the United States, acting through its national
organization. I shall not venture to explain why the lawyers of the
United States have failed to act in a matter of this importance. It
is not to the credit of the legal profession that it has been in this
respect so much behind the medical profession. Action has, how-
ever, recently been taken by a few of the states. A code of legal
ethics was adopted in 1898 by the Bar Association of Colorado.
And in i9o3 the Kentucky State Bar Association did likewise. It is
possible that similar action may have been taken in other states. I
wish it might be done in all the states and by the American Bar
Association as well. I am sure that such action would prove help-
ful to the profession throughout the country. I cannot yield assent
to the proposition that it is better that rules of conduct should not
be reduced to exact detail lest the spirit be cramped in the letter.
The men of light and leading who do not stand in need of any writ-
ten code will not permit themselves to be cramped by the letter of it,
and those whose conscience is less sensitive and whose ideas of pro-
fessional honor are not so clear and strong as they might be are
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likely to find themselves considerably helped by it. Law has in
every community an educative force. And a code of legal ethics
approved by the Bar Association of the country could not but exert
a wholesome influence upon the American bar.
The French bar is controlled by a written code of ethics. It
regulates by the highest standard every phase of the advocate's pro-
fessional life. "Nothing," it has been said, "is too small for its care,
nothing too great for its control." It inculcates diligence, sobriety,
truth, .honesty, courtesy, dignity and independence. It applies to
every relation of the advocate, to his general duties as well as to his
duty to his clients, to the judges and to his brother advocates. It
affirms that one cannot be a perfect advocate, if he be not a good and
honest man. In each judicial department of that country exists a
council of advocates which tries all infractions of the code, and cen-
sures, suspends, or dismisses those who are found guilty of a trans-
gression of the ethics of the profession. The bar of that country is
not only a thoroughly educated body of men, but one trained "in the
highest school of professional ethics." It is said to be organized to
the encouragement and advancement of everything advantageous to
the state, and to the resistance of everything hurtful to the state.
As the law of the land is not to be found in the written statutes
alone, but may be derived from unwritten sources, so we are not to
assume, because a written code of legal ethics has not been formally
adopted in a particular state, that therefore none exists. Profes-
sional ethics can never be dependent on a written code. A man of
sound moral sense does not abstain from murder or theft because
legislatures have enacted laws prohibiting, under penalty, such a vio-
lation of man's rights to life and property. And a !awyer is unwor-
thy of membership in the profession who would regulate his con-
duct solely according to what the law permits rather than by what
morality and honor require. But if we seek for the rules which
should govern professional conduct, we find them indicated in
the oaths administered to those who are admitted to practice, and in
the judicial decisions handed down, in cases in which lawyers have
been rebuked or disbarred, as well as in the precepts which have
been handed down from one generation of lawyers to another as
showing the consensus of opinion which has prevailed among the
honorable members of the profession in this and other lands.
I have noted in some of the addresses which have been delivered
by those who have spoken here on similar occasions that reference
has been made to the oaths administered to members of the bar in
certain of the states of this country. I have found in none of the
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oaths to which they have made reference, not even in that adminis-
tered in the state of Washington or in the New England States, a
more admirable setting forth of the ethical duties of the lawyer than
is to be found in the oath which is taken by the lawyers of Germany.
In that country the lawyer swears obedience to the constitution and
the laws, and to faithfully and industriously aid everybody, the poor
man quite as willingly as the rich man,-without fear of the courts-
to his right, by advice, speech and action; that he will not over-
charge parties with fees; not obstruct the amicable settlement of
law suits, but further it is as much as possible; not retard or hinder
justice in any way whatsoever; never give countenance to dishonest
designs of parties, particularly not suggest to any party or any
accused person groundless subterfuges and statements contrary to
the truth, or recantation; and if he should find the cause of a party,
in his persuasion, to be without foundation, or not based upon the
law, and he could not amicably dissuade such party, as is his duty to
do from its intent, that he will not represent it in court in such cause
any longer; that he will never, in any case taken in hand by him,
speak and act more than he is instructed to do; that he will keep
secrets intrusted to him inviolate; take care of and return in good
time public papers and records laid before him or communicated to
him; keep safely funds which may be intrusted to him, and give a
conscientious account of them; and finally show to the public
authorities and courts, before which he appears as counsel, due
respect, and abstain from all invective against the same; also that
he will not be prevented from the fulfillment of these duties either
by favor, gifts, friendship or enmity, or any other impure motive,
and that he will altogether so behave as is becoming and befitting a
conscientious and duteous attorney and counsellor at law. In any
country which administers such an oath a tricky, quibbling and
mendacious bar is impossible.
The ethical basis of conduct for the lawyer is the same as for any
other member of society. That which one cannot honorably do as
a man he cannot honorably do as a lawyer. The profession imposes
no obligations upon its members which degrade true manhood and
debase those higher ideals which men of nobility and chivalry
always cherish. In the pursuit of all ends, whether within or with-
out the profession, we are alike restrained by God's law as well as
by man's law to good means and to good ends. No one, be he law-
yer or layman, has a right to seek wrong ends by good means. And
no one has a right to seek good ends by wrong means. We cannot
do evil that good may come of it. The due administration of justice
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does not involve a subversion of ordinary ethical rules, and the gen-
eral code of morals makes no exception in favor of the legal pro-
fession, but is applicable alike to all classes and conditions of men.
Lord Macaulay in his great essay on Lord Bacon gives the
impression that in England the lawyer's code of ethics permitted a
man "with a wig on his head and a band round his neck," to do for
a guinea what, without those appendages, he would think it wicked
and infamous to do for an empire. Macaulay intimates that law-
yers of his day, knowing a statement to be true, thought themselves
neverthless justified in doing all that could be done "by sophistry,
by rhetoric, by solemn asseveration, by indignant exclamation, by
play of features, by terrifying one honest witness, by perplexing
another, to cause a jury to think that statement false." If the code
of legal ethics which existed in England when Macaulay wrote
countenanced the conduct to which he refers,--and I am frank to
say I do not believe it did-it is certainly true that no honorable
member of the profession in either country to-day rcognizes any
such code. There is no code of ethics either in England or. in
America which is based upon the theory that there are two kinds of
morality; that one kind applies to the legal profession and the other
to the rest of mankind. If one undertakes to tell you that there is
one morality for the bar and another for the rest of the world, be
assured he is a teacher of false doctrine. To follow after him is to
go to your own undoing.
John Milton's father intended him for the ministry-a high and
sacred calling. But the choice of the father was not the choice of
the son. Milton refused to enter the ministry because he was
unwilling to enter a profession which he thought required him to
advocate doctrines which he did not believe to be true. Can a man
dominated by as strict a sense of honor as characterized Milton
become a lawyer? That question has long been a mooted one.
Many men have in all the years come to the bar with serious mis-
givings concerning it. That devout Christian men of exalted char-
acter have entered the profession and attained to eminence in it can-
not be denied. How could they do it? inquires the casuist. How
can an honorable man enter a profession in which he will have possi-
bly to maintain the side that is wrong? As only one side can be
right, the lawyer, he tells us, must be half the time endeavoring to
establish that which is wrong, seeking to accomplish injustice.
The fallacy of his contention lies in his failure to appreciate that
in its inception at least there are two sides to every case. The pur-
pose of the litigation is to ascertain what the exact facts are and then
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apply the law to the facts. "It is only on the anvil of discussion
that the spark of truth can be struck out." It is seldom the case
that a lawyer goes into a litigation believing that his client is in the
wrong. Lawyers do not go into court to lose cases, but to win them.
Their reputation is enhanced by the victories they win. It is not
improved by the defeats they suffer. A venerable jurist, of the fin-
est sense of honor and the purest integrity, is quoted as saying after
fifty years of the most laborious professional life, that he had never
but once thought his client in the wrong.
But the chief difficulty which the casuist encounters is to recon-
cile with his standards of honor the defense of one believed to be
guilty of crime. So far as the majority of lawyers is concerned the
question is little more than an academic speculation. The practice
of the criminal law engages the attention of very few members of
the bar. In the popular mind, however, the profession is often con-
demned because of the opinion which so many people entertain that
the lawyer, in defending a known criminal, is endeavoring to cheat
the law and acquit the prisoner and thus wrong society and the state.
Wendell Phillips in his speech on Rufus Choate pictured a Par-
thenon of jurists in which the visitor was to be shown from statue to
statue. Greece was to exhibit her Solon and his code of laws, and
Rome her Papinian, and France her D'Aguesseau, and England her
Erskine; and then New England was to point to Choate 'and say
"This is Choate, who made it safe to murder, and of whose health
thieves inquired before they began to steal." Now if Choate in the
practice of his profession made it safe to murder and to steal, we
shall be compelled to admit that his occupation was a very poor one.
To call such business "a little shady" would be to dignify it too
highly. It would clearly deserve condemnation as something
unworthy and quite indefensible. And yet no man in Massachu-
setts stood higher than Choate. No man questioned his personal
integrity. No man cast suspicion upon his uprightness of life. He
was not merely of brilliant intellect, but he was likewise of high
ideals. The old commonwealth of Massachusetts holds him in rev-
erence to this day as one of her greatest and noblest sons. In the
court house at Boston is a statue erected to perpetuate his fame.
A theory which condemns his calling while it exalts the man can-
not be sound. The fallacy of it is easily shown. In every civilized
state the principle is recognized that the government ought to pun-
ish only those who have violated its laws and whose guilt has been
established in accordance with the forms which have been fixed by
law. That this principle should be adhered to is essential to moral-
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ity and to the maintenance of social order. The lawyer who insists
that a man accused of crime shall not be punished until his violation
of the law he is charged with breaking has been established in the
courts and his guilt proven by evidence such as the law requires in
that class of cases, is discharging a duty to the state which is as
important to society as any he can render. The state has no righc
to take life or deprive a citizen of his liberty unless he has broken a
law and that fact has been established by legal evidence in the man-
ner prescribed by law. A departure from that proposition means
the overthrow of social order. In its place would come lynch law
and anarchy.
It is because of this fundamental truth that the lawyer is justified
in appearing in court in defence of a criminal. He is there not to
subvert the laws of his country but to conserve them, not to pull
down the pillars of the state but to uphold them, not to find some
way by which a wicked man is to be let loose to prey upon society
to its undoing. He is there to see that justice is done and that no
man shall be condemned by the law until his guilt has been estab-
lished by the law and in accordance with the forms of law. In ren-
dering this service to the prisoner the lawyer discharges a duty to
the state as well as to the defendant, and he is not called on to do
anything an honorable man should not do. In discharging this duty
he must, of course, be governed by the same high principles by
which his conduct is governed in other cases. He cannot misrepre-
sent either the law or the facts. He cannot play the part of a trick-
ster and pervert evidence or quibble with words.
A question which has troubled the conscience of many has been
whether a lawyer can properly take advantage of the statute of
frauds or the statute of limitations to defeat a claim otherwise valid
and which is asserted against his client. It is necessary to remem-
ber that these rules have been prescribed because they were found
essential to the due administration of justice. They are regarded
by the courts and by the profession as salutary. For this reason, in
the judgment of the profession, it is not immoral for a lawyer to
assist in enforcing them against a negligent party who has ignored
them.
An honorable lawyer who respects himself and his profhssion
will decline, with contempt, all cases in which a party seeks to sus-
tain some unconscionable advantage which he may have obtained
through fraud, accident or mistake. "Yes," Mr. Herndon who was
his partner reports Mr. Lincoln as advising a client, "we can doubt-
less gain your case for you; we can set a whole neighborhood at
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loggerheads; we can distress a widowed mother and her six father-
less children, and thereby get for you six hundred dollars to which
you seem to have a legal claim, but which rightfully belongs as
much to the woman and her children as it does to you. You must
remember, however, that some things legally right are not morally
right. We shall not take your case, but we will give you a little
advice for which we will charge you nothing. You seem to be ai
sprightly, energetic man. We would advise you to try your hand
at making six hundred dollars in some other way."
Among the cases which no lawyer should touch are the fraudu-
lent divorces which parties obtain on false allegations of residence,
and on testimony which makes a false presentation of fact to the
court. Any lawyer who meddles with such cases of necessity for-
feits his reputation.
The duty of the lawyer to his client is to advise and assist him in
every honorable way to maintain and defend those rights and priv-
ileges secured to him by the constitution and the laws of the country.
The relation existing between the lawyer and his client imposes
upon the former as well as upon the latter the duty of observing the
utmost candor. If authorities are conflicting upon the question of
law which the proposed litigation involves, the client should be fully
informed of the fact and not urged to engage in a doubtful contest
without full knowledge of its uncertainty. And if a case is of such
a nature that a slight variation of the proof might change the entire
legal aspect, that fact must be made known to the client also. Liti-
gation should never be commenced until the client fully understands
the situation.
It is the duty of a lawyer to discourage his client from litigation
and endeavor, if possible, to bring about a settlement of the contro-
versy by agreement between the parties when this can be done
without an improper sacrifice of his rights. "As a peacemaker,"
said Lincoln, "the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good
man." Lawyers who seek to avoid litigation and compromise diffi-
culties are of that number to whom the beatitude, "Blessed are the
peacemakers," most fittingly applies.
In marked contrast is the lawyer who goes about looking for liti-
gation. That kind of a lawyer is a mortification to his professional
brethren. To stir up strife is contrary to law and forbidden in
morals. No man who has self-respect, or who regards the ethics
of the profession will chase an ambulance or search the records to
discover defects in titles in order that he may secure a client and
commence a suit.
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A lawyer consulted upon a matter concerning which he is uncer-
tain as to what the law really is owes it to his client and to his own
reputation to reserve his opinion until he can take time for investiga-
tion and reflection. Some lawyers and 6specially those who have
come recently to the bar, fear the effect upon a client of not appear-
ing ready at once to express a definite opinion on any question.
The practice in the end brings them into disrepute.
The lawyer cannot assume that he has no moral responsibility
for the unconscionable acts of a client. The lawyer is not without
fault who intentionally so draws a contract or drafts an instrument
that a client may take unfair advantage of another by virtue of some
clause, the true meaning of which he has concealed in legal verbiage.
He who assists a dishonest client by counselling him how to organ-
ize and so exploit a corporation as to defraud the public and obtain
good money for worthless stock is as much a scoundrel as is his
unscrupulous client.
One cannot advise a client how he can so dispose of his property
as to defraud his creditois and co-operate with him in accomplishing
such a result and not be as guilty as his client. That there are such
lawyers is unfortunately true. But this class of men is likely to
discover that while there were no lawyers in Dante's Inferno some
will be found in the real Inferno.
The duty which the lawyer owes his client imposes no obligation
to make that client's malevolence toward the opposing litigant his
own. To abuse the opposite party and indulge in offensive person-
alities for no better purpose than to gratify the whims and malicious
feelings of a client is most unworthy of a high-minded attorney.
D'Aguesseau, who is regarded as the ornament of the century in
which he lived and who attained to the high office of Chancellor of
France, said to the bar of his country: "Let the zeal which you
bring to the defence of your clients be incapable of making you the
ministers of their passion, and the organs of their secret malignity."
In speaking of the duty of the lawyer to his client I desire to
warn you against the mistake of governing your conduct according
to the standard which it is too commonly supposed that Lord Broug-
ham laid down in his remarkable speech in defence of Queen Caro-
line. He there said: "An advocate, by the sacred duty which he
owes to his client, knows, in the discharge of that office, but one per-
son in the world-that client and none other. To save that client
by all expedient means, to protect that client at all hazards and costs
to all others,--and among others, to himself-is the highest and
most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard the alarm,
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the suffering, the torment, the destruction which he may bring upon
the other. Nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those
of an advocate, and casting them, if need be, to the wind, he must
go on, reckless of the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be
to involve his country in confusion for his client's protection." Giv-
ing to this utterance the meaning which is ordinarily placed upon it
I have only to say that it has been properly denounced as "a degen-
erate view" of professional duty and honor. The Court of Appeals
has fittingly said of it that, "such a proposition shocks the moral
sense." (32 N. Y. i33.)
But Lord Brougham, although he spoke in the heat of conflict,
never uttered the words to which I have referred with any such
meaning as too often has been wrongly given to them. Those
words are said to have been understood at the time and to have been
accepted by the better opinion since as a veiled threat to the crown
officers that Brougham, if driven to the wall by the exposure of the
imprudencies of his client,--not calling them by a harsher name-
would retaliate by raising the question of the King's marriage to
Mrs. Fitzherbert, regardless of the serious consequences which
might result regarding the title to the throne and the succession.
The ethics of the profession require that in the conduct of
litigation the utmost courtesy should be extended to the counsel on
the opposing side. Litigation is not between attorneys but between
clients, and attorneys are not to try each other but the merits of the
cause. Whatever ill feeling may exist between the litigants their
attorneys are not to partake of it in their demeanor toward each
other. As it is improper to abuse and vilify the opposite party to
the suit, or his witnesses, merely to gratify the malevolent feeling of
a client, so it is contrary to all propriety to indulge in offensive
comments upon his counsel, ridiculing his personal peculiarities and
idiosyncracies. Gentlemen never lay aside their dignity and descend
to blackguardism. If such conduct calls forth the applause of the
vulgar, it provokes the contempt of all whose opinion is of value.
If the opposite counsel fail to show that courtesy which is due
and it becomes necessary to rebuke him the circumstances must
determine how it shall be done. A story is told that on one occasion
a lawyer challenged a juror because of his personal acquaintance
with Mr. Lincoln, who was on the opposite side. When it came
time for Mr. Lincoln to examine he gravely followed his adversary's
lead and began to ask the talesmen whether they were acquainted
with his opponent. After two or three had been thus- questioned
the judge interfered. "Now, Mr. Lincoln," he observed severely,
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"you are wasting time. The mere fact that a juror knows your
opponent does not disqualify him." "No, your Honor," responded
Lincoln, dryly. "But I am afraid some of the gentlemen may not
know him, which would place me at a decided disadvantage."
In the celebrated Speculum Juris of Guillaume Durand, who
died in 1296, I find directions regarding an advocate's behavior to
the advocates on the other side. "You are not to indulge in person-
alities towards him," he says, "but to treat him decorously; unless
indeed he treat you rudely: and when replying to his argument you
should commend him slightly, but not too much, and commend him
by equivocal words. But you must not treat your adversary with
contumely, or call him, in plain words, a ruffian or a prevaricator;
or insinuate as much, as by saying, 'I am not a thief,' thereby inti-
mating that he is. But if the other accuse you of falsehood. you
may safely say 'You are a liar,' but you should protest that you do
not say so with intent to injure him, but only to defend your own
cause. But if your adversary do not revile you, you should use
temperate words, such as, 'with your permission,' or, 'saving your
reverence,' or some such words. If he have listened to you patiently,
you are to reciprocate, but if he have made a noise or a tittering,
you may do the like. You are to note well and retain in your me-n-
ory what he says; for if he has spoken long, it is hard if you cannot
find fault with something. It is better to be silent than to speak
foolishly; according to the proverb Mas val callar que fol parlar.
.If your adversary seem to get the better in argument, or if
your cause be weak, go off warily to another point; and if he be of
a bilious temperament, you should indirectly and very smoothly say
something to make him angry; for then he will not be able to shape
well his speech." (Year Book 32-33 Edward I, p. XXV.)
The duty of the lawyer to the court pledges him by his oath of
office to diligent service and good faith to the court as well as to his
client. He must strictly observe courtesy and truthfulness. By
stating as facts what he knows are not facts, to deceive the court,
by misquoting evidence, by making unfair citations of authorities,
the lawyer violates his oath and the ethics of his profession and
seeks by dishonest methods to support his cause. To mislead the
court has been called a sort of "domestic treason." He may be sure
that his sin will find him out. Deceit in one case maysometimes
win a case, but the man who practiced it has sacrificed his future
and destroyed his influence with the court. The lawyer, as an offi-
cer of the court, must give fair and candid counsel to the judge if
he expects to have respect accorded to his utterances.
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In Durand's Speculum Juris to which I before referred, advice "s
given as to the behavior of advocates towards the judges. As he
wrote six hundred years ago I call attention to his words: "When
before the judge, you are to take off your cap and make an obei-
sance, graduated according to the rank of the judge. Do not be
loquacious. Address the judge in a manner that may be pleasing to
him, and if he be angry, do not rejoin. If a point is being mooted
in another's cause, and you know a canon or law which decides -it,
cite it boldly, for thus you will have credit with the judge in a case
of your own. But, if you are acquainted with the judge, be silent,
for perhaps he will call you to consult with him, according to the
Lombard custom. Do not laugh causelessly before the judge.
When the judge speaks, listen respectfully and then laud his wisdom
and eloquence. When your time for speaking comes, rise grace-
fully, but not arrogantly; put on an affable and pleasant look; d3
not move your head or feet awkwardly. A proper management
of tongue, feet, hands and eyes is important. After a slight pause,
begin by requesting a favorable hearing from the judge and the
audience, and by commending the judge for various (special) qual-
ities; but be careful about attributing all these to one person; and
be careful not to say anything to offend the judge. Some say that
an advocate should frequently go and whisper to the judge so that
he on the other side may fancy that they are talking about him and
thus lose his temper."
But if courtesy is due from the lawyer to the court it is also due
from the court to the lawyer. The obligation is reciprocal. Thre6
hundred years after the Speculum Juris was written Bacon wrote
his Essay on Judicature, of which it has been said that those on the
bench would do well to read it over every year. In writing of the
duty of the judge towards the attorney Bacon said: "There is due
from the judge some commendation and gracing, when causes are
well-handled and fair pleaded, especially towards the side which
obtaineth not; for that upholds in the client the reputation of his
counsel, and beats down in him the conceit of his cause."
Occasions sometimes arise, though happily they are few in num-
ber, when an advocate must decide between the duty which he owes
the client and the duty he owes the court. The necessity arose upon
the trial of the Dean of St. Asaph. The jury was trying to return
a verdict which would have released the defendant from the crime
with which he was charged. Mr. Justice Buller was endeavoring
to record the verdict as the jury did not wish. Mr. Erskine per-
sisted that the verdict should be recorded as the jury desired. "Sit
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down, Sir !" said the court. "Remember your duty or I shall be
obliged to proceed in another manner." "Your Lordship," Erskine
replied, "may proceed in what manner you think fit; I know my
duty as well as your Lordship knows yours. I shall not alter my
conduct." This man, regarded as the greatest advocate of all time,
always had proper respect for the court, but never permitted a judge
to unduly interfere in the discharge of what he regarded as his duty
to his client. The admonition of the mighty Mansfield himself
could not deter him while he was yet a briefless barrister. To
Mansfield's statement that Lord Sandwich was not before the court
Erskine answered: "I know he is not before the court, and for that
very reason I will bring him before the court." Lieber states the
principle which should govern counsel in cases of this character.
"A true advocate," he says, "will never forget that in defending a
citizen he is as much the representative of the law of the land, whhich
wills protection to everyone, as is the judge, and, with all respect
for the bench, he will, if the case calls for it, stand up for his client's
rights." The true lawyer who respects himself and possesses both
an intellectual and a moral conscience will distinguish btween the
courtesy which is due the bench and that obsequious and servile sub-
serviency to the court which no judge has any right to demand, and
which, if demanded, ought never to be accorded. The rights of a
client are never to be sacrificed in order that the attorney may main-
tain his "standing" with the court.
As the lawyer is an officer of the court he is by that fact an offi-
cer of the state, the judiciary being one of three co-ordinate depart-
ments of the government. Justinian's direction to Tribonian was,
"commence then to instruct scholars in the science of the laws and
conduct them along the way we have opened in order to make them
good officers of justice and of the state." Originally in England
the right to appoint attorneys was, like the right to appoint the
judges, a royal privilege. Prior to the statute of Westminster II,
c, 10, (1285), all attorneys were made by letters patent issued under
the broad seal, and which commanded the justices to admit the
persons named to be attorneys of the court. In New Jersey to this
day attorneys-at-law are invested with their privileges by letters
patent issued by the governor of the state on the recommendation of
the Supreme Court certifying that the persons named have been
found possessed of the proper qualifications. (70 N. J. L. 537.)
The lawyer, because he is in a sense an officer of the state, owes to
the government a greater responsibility than the ordinary citizen.
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Among the duties which the lawyer owes the state is that of sav-
ing the judiciary from becoming the spoils of party. The selection
of the judges should never be left to that odious creature-a party
boss, whose dominant influence in American politics constitutes so
serious a menace to our institutions, and who is so ill fitted to pass
upon the fitness of men for the judicial office. The interests of the
Commonwealth and of the profession require that only men of
learning, probity and of the judicial temperament should be per-
mitted to sit in the high seats of justice. And whether a man is
possessed of these qualifications is known best to his professional
brethren. It would be well, therefore, if judicial nominations could
be determined or influenced by the profession rather than by the
politicians. The bar associations in New York and Chicago on sev-
eral occasions have set an example to the bar of the country which
is worthy of all emulation in taking active steps to secure a non-
partisan judiciary.
Another duty which the lawyer owes the state is to maintain the
confidence of the people in the courts and to defend the judiciary
against unjust criticism, which is not always saved from being mis-
chievous by the fact that it is-wholly false. A reckless criticism of
the courts indulged in by ignorant and mistaken agitators may do
much harm, and in our country has already to some extent and
among certain classes of people created a most unfortunate distrust
of the impartiality of our judicial tribunals. American judges, with
here and there a rare exception, are men of high honor who seek to
hold the scales of justice even. No one knows this better than the
lawyers who practice in their courts, and no one is better qualified
to say so when the necessity arises. There are persons who profess
to think that
"The net of law is spread so wide,
No sinner from its sweep may hide.
Its meshes are so fine and strong,
They take in every child of wrong.
0 wondrous web of mystery!
Big fish alone can creep through thee."
The prejudice is not peculiar to our time. Shakespeare gave expres-
sion to the same feeling in his day when he wrote:
"In the corrupted currents of this world
Offence's gilded hands may shove by justice
And oft 'tis seen the wicked prize itself
Buys out the laws."
The same thought was again expressed when he said:
"Plate sin with gold
And the strong lance of justice hurtless breaks."
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The profession knows that this prejudice is ill founded. The coun-
try has lately seen United States senators convicted of crime, and
in a United States Court in Georgia two men sentenced to the pen-
itentiary who had defrauded the government of a million and a half
of money. That laws have been systematically violated for years by
great corporations and that those responsible have gone unpunished
cannot be denied. But courts are not responsible for the fact that
in the eighteen years existence of the Interstate Commerce law only
one conviction for a violation of the law was obtained, and that until
last December there had not been a single conviction under the
Elkins act of 19o3. There can be no convictions unless officials
whose duty it is to institute the necessary proceedings bring the vio-
laters of law to the bar of justice. Let the blame always rest where
it belongs, but never where it does not belong.
Another duty which is due from the lawyer to the state is an
honorable discharge of his obligations as a law-maker in the legis-
lative assemblies of state and nation. Lawyers predominate in all
halls of legislation. They are sent there because their knowledge of
existing laws, and of the defects in those laws and how they can
best be remedied, qualify them above other men for the work of the
law-giver. They are expected to see that onlygood and effective laws
are placed in the statute books. They are in the legislature as coun-
sel for the state, and their duty is to legislate in the interests of the
state. The ethical obligation is to the Commonwealth.
But the lawyers who get themselves elected to legislative bodies
not to serve the state but to further private interests, and who really
represent corporations seeking special privileges are as false to their
trust as lawyers who in the courts betray their clients. They are in
fact more deserving of censure for they betray not one client but a
whole state. It is a shameful fact that lawyers who resist with hot
indignation any suggestion to betray the cause of a client pending
before the courts are yet willing to betray the cause of the people
in the halls of legislation. They sacrifice the welfare of the state to
private interests and seem unconscious of the infamy. The con-
tentment of a people is dependent on a system of wise, just and equal
laws. When a conviction becomes dominant in the popular mind
that legislative bodies are rotten at the core, that legislation and offi-
cial places are bought and sold as in the days of the Roman Empire,
that corporations write the laws by which they are supposed to be
regulated, and that those laws are so framed that the public may
be plundered "according to the statutes in such case made and pro-
vided," and that it has been possible for corporations to intentionally
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ruin some and enrich others,--these things tend to provoke a social-
istic and anarchistic spirit and to cause men to lose confidence in the
honesty and beneficence of the government. The country is to-day
passing through a period of national humiliation. Recent investi-
gations have brought to public notice shameless deeds which dis-
honor the American character and cause honest men to hang their
heads in sorrow and mortification. Each new day brings some
new revelation, and borne on the wings of every wind come startling
disclosures, affecting the leading corporations of the country.
Thirty years ago in the Constitutional Convention of Pennsylvania,
Jeremiah S. Black, a great and brilliant lawyer, complained of the
corruption that existed even then in the legislature of his own
state. He spoke of the fact that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
had been clothed with imperial power. "That corporation," he said,
"has grown so mighty that its little finger is thicker than the loins
of the Commonwealth which created it. I do not say that it
bestrides your narrow state like a Colossus, for the ancient Colossus
of Rhodes was but the image of a pigmy in comparison to this
Colossus of railroads." And then he went on to declare that "If the
honest citizens of the state who have been so basely betrayed by
these miscreants (the members of the legislature) would obey the
impulses of their natural indignation, and had infinite power to work
their will upon them, they would set them upon the remotest battle-
ments of God's creation-far out upon the borders of chaos and old
night-and then lash them naked around the circumference of the
universe." Corruption, he said, was getting worse and worse not
only in Pennsylvania but throughout the country, and he predicted
that our institutions must utterly perish unless we stopped the mis-
chief and cut out the cancer. I cannot but think that the condi-
tions which he described, and which have disgraced other states
than his, would never have been possible if the lawyers in legislative
bodies served their client, the Commonwealth, with the same fidelity
with which they serve their private clients.
It sometimes becomes the duty of the bar to resist the govern-
ment itself, and on such occasions the advocate will never permit
any personal considerations to interfere with the discharge of that
duty. No lawyer will forget Erskine's declaration that he would
at all hazards assist the dignity, independence and integrity of the
English bar, adding that: "From the moment that any advocate can
be permitted to say that he will or wili not stand between the Crown
and the subject arraigned in the court where lie daily sits to practice,
from that moment the liberties of England are at an end." Chateau-
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briand in his "Melanges" has described, in words which the world
has not forgotten, the defense of Louis Sixteenth by M. de Malesh-
erbes. When the King was dragged before the convention for
judicial murder Malesherbes came forth from his retirement and
volunteered his services for his defense. "Plutarch," says Chateau-
briand, "has transmitted to us nothing more heroic. When the
King was led to the convention M. de Malesherbes addressed him
only as 'Sire' and 'Your Majesty.' Treilhard heard him, and cried
out furiously, 'What renders you so bold to use words which the
convention has prescribed?' 'My contempt for you and for life,'
replied M. de Malesherbes. This cost Malesherbes his head, but in
defending his King he had discharged his duty fearlessly. In our
own day we have seen a brilliant French advocate, without hope of
remuneration and knowing that his life was in danger and that the
public sentiment of his country was against him, walk into the arena
of justice and vindicate the rights of Dreyfus against the govern-
ment and the military tribunals of France.
Professional ethics deafen the ear of the lawyer to the clamor of
the mob as well as to the threats of the government. The louder the
popular clamor the more imperative becomes the duty of the lawyer
to face and defy it. Men, when they are condemned, must be con-
demned by the law and not be convicted and punished by the public
outcry. John Adams was right when he said that one of the best
services he ever rendered his country was when in i77o he defended
in the courts of Boston Captain Preston and his six soldiers of the
British army who were charged with murder in firing upon the pop-
ulace. Mr. Adams vindicated the majesty of the law although he
called down on his own head at the time a great clamor of rebuke
and wrath.
As Froissart said of his chronicles of chivalry, let mention be
made of these things "to encourage all valorous hearts and to show
them honorable example."
Mr. Gladstone, in 1894, at a dinner given in honor of a distin-
guished member of the French bar used this language: "I have
always felt that the bar is inseparable from our national life, from
the security of our national institutions, but never, so long as I
looked at England alone, did I understand the full extent of its
value. Some years ago, it was my lot to be a witness of cruel oppres-
sion in a country in the South of Europe. There the executive
power did not merely break the law, but deliberately supplanted .t
and set it aside and established in its stead a system of pure arbitrary
will. To my astonishment, I found that the audacity of tyranny
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which had put down chambers and municipalities and had extin-
guished the press, had not been able to do one thing, to silence the
bar. I found in the courts of justice, under the bayonets of soldiers
-for they bristled with bayonets-in the teeth of power, in con-
tempt of corruption and in defiance of violence and arbitrary rule,
lawyers rising in their places and defending the cause of the
accused, with a freedom and fearlessness which could not be sur-
passed in free England."
That justice travels with a leaden hoof is the fault, in a great
degree, of our profession. The law's delay is now, as in the days
of the Prince of Denmark, among the greatest "ills that flesh is heir
to." The lawyer's accountability in this matter is in part due to the
fact that in all legislative bodies the lawyers shape legislation and
can establish the modes of judicial procedure. It is also due in part
to the dilatory tactics of lawyers who in actual litigation seek by
every possible means to prevent a decision being reached on the
merits, and when it has been reached endeavor to prevent its being
carried into effect. A lawyer is guilty of discreditable conduct who
seeks with persistent ingenuity and by technical attacks on imma-
terial points in either a civil or a criminal proceeding to defeat a
judgment sustained alike by the law and the evidence. In criminal
cases, when the evidence has established beyond a doubt the guilt of
the accused and when juries have been properly instructed and no
errors have been committed, cases are appealed with no reason for
doing so except to delay execution of judgment. The Court of
Appeals of New York has rebuked the conduct of attorneys of this
sort who seek to use the forms of law to subvert the law. "Attor-
neys and counsellors admitted to practice in the courts of this state
are under a duty," said the court, "to aid in the administration of
justice, and they cannot consistently with this duty engage in vexa-
tious proceedings merely for the purpose of undermining the final
judgments of the courts and defeating the behests of the law. It
ought to be a subject of inquiry, therefore, whether they can thus
become the allies of the criminal classes and the foes of organized
society without exposing themselves to the disciplinary powers of
the Supreme Court." (128 N. Y. 589.) Attorneys who indulge in
such conduct help to bring the administration of justice into dis-
repute, and create a lawless spirit among the people who grow tired
of the law's delays and resort to lynchings, which disgrace the coun-
try and shock the world.
In so far as delays are due to old and defective methods of pro-
cedure it is the duty of the profession to lead in their reform. That
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"justice delayed is justice denied" is but too true. The responsi-
bility is ours, and so long as such a condition is permitted to exist
the public suffers and the profession is damaged. The English
courts, once the most dilatory in the world, have become in recent
years the most expeditious. So shameful were the delays of the
English Court of Chancery, so graphically described by Dickens in
"Bleak House," that someone has said that over its portals should
have been written Dante's inscription on the gates of hell, "He who
enters here leaves Hope behind." But even in the courts of the
common law long delays cast a shadow over the fortunes of liti-
gants. The lawyers of England reformed these abuses, and more
effective methods of procedure were adopted. In our own country
in many states where a like necessity exists like action should be
taken to remove what is a serious menace to the authority and use-
fulness of the courts.
The enormous expense to which litigants are in some of our
states subjected amounts in many cases to a denial of justice. The
fees of stenographers and court officials are often excessive and not
infrequently are greater than the compensation of counsel. Law
ought to be cheap and not dear, and the poor should not feel that
law is the patrimony of the rich. It is the duty of the bar of Amer-
ica to take heed that in our country the historian of the future shall
not write of us what Gibbon wrote of the Roman Empire prior to
the reforms of Justinian. "The expense of the pursuit," said he,
"sometimes exceeded the value of the prize and the fairest rights
were abandoned by the poverty or prudence of the claimants. Such
costly justice might tend to abate the spirit of litigation, but the
unequal pressure seems only to increase the influence of the rich and
to aggravate the misery of the poor. By these dilatory and expen-
sive proceedings the wealthy pleader obtains a more certain advan-
tage than he could hope from the accidental corruption of a judge."
You come to the bar, gentlemen, at a critical period in the coun-
try's history. Never before since the government was established
has agitation against existing institutions been so reckless and revo-
lutionary and so general as now. The duty of the lawyer to the
state- assumes new importance in- the face of the conditions which-
now confront this nation. Let me, therefore, commend to your
thoughtful attention the weighty words of a great constitutional
lawyer. In his address as president of the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1894 the late Chief Justice Cooley said: "What I desire to
impress at this time upon the members of the legal profession is that
every one of them is or should be, from his very position and from
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the license which gives him special privileges in the determination
of legal questions and controversies, a public leader and teacher,
whose obligations to support the constitution and laws and to act
with all due fidelity to the courts is not fully performed when the
fundamental organization of society is assailed or threatened, or the
laws defied or likely to be in the community in which he lives, as a
result of revolutionary purpose, or of ignorance, or unreasoning
passion, unless he comes to the front as a supporter of settled institu-
tions and of public order, and does what he properly and lawfully
can to correct any sentiment, general or local, that would in itself be
a public danger, or be likely to lead to disorder or unlawful vio-
lence."
To this eminent jurist it seemed a low and very unworthy view
of the lawyer's office to assume that his duty was simply to prose-
cute or defend in the courts for a compensation to be paid, and that
he owed no duty to society to expose false theories and counteract
public ignorance and inculcate respect for law and courts and gov-
ernment and the rights of property.
Henry Wade Rogers, LL.D.,
Dean of the Yale Law School.
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